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Abstract
We present the formalization and verification of a recently developed cryptographic protocol for
certified email. Relying on a tool for automatic protocol analysis, we establish the key security
properties of the protocol. This case study explores the use of general correspondence assertions
in automatic proofs, and aims to demonstrate the considerable power of the tool and its applicability
to non-trivial, interesting protocols.
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1. Introduction
A great deal of effort has been invested in the development of techniques for specifying
and verifying security protocols in recent years. This effort is justified, in particular,
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by the seriousness of security flaws and the relative simplicity of security protocols.
It has produced a number of interesting methods and effective tools. These range from
mathematical frameworks for manual proofs to fully automatic model checkers. The
former are fundamentally constrained by the unreliability and time-scarcity of human
provers. The latter tend to be limited to basic properties of small systems, such as the
secrecy of session keys in finite-state simplifications of protocols; they may be viewed as
useful but ultimately limited automatic testers. The development of automatic or semi-
automatic tools that overcome these limitations is an important problem and the subject of
active research.
In previous work, we have developed a protocol checker [1,7,8] that can establish
secrecy and authenticity properties of protocols represented directly as programs in a
minimal programming notation (an extension of the pi calculus). The protocols need not
be finite-state; the tool can deal with an unbounded number of protocol sessions, even
executed in parallel. Nevertheless, the proofs are fully automatic and often fast.
This paper reports on a fairly ambitious application of this tool in the verification of a
recently published protocol for certified email [2]. The protocol allows a sender to send an
email message to a receiver, in such a way that the receiver gets the message if and only
if the sender obtains an unforgeable receipt for the message. The protocol is non-trivial,
partly because of a number of real-world constraints. The verification yields assurance
about the soundness of the protocol. It also suggests a promising method for reasoning
about other, related protocols.
This case study aims to demonstrate the considerable power of the tool and its
applicability to interesting protocols. It has also served in guiding certain improvements
to the tool. Specifically, formalizing the main properties of the protocol has led us to a
generalization of the tool for handling a large class of correspondence assertions [18].
The bulk of the proofs remains fully automatic; for the code presented in this paper, the
automatic proofs take only 4 s on an Intel Xeon 1.7 GHz processor. Easy manual arguments
show that the correspondence assertions capture the expected security guarantees for the
protocol. Because the protocol is expressed directly in a programming notation, without
limitation to finite-state instances, the need for additional arguments to justify the protocol
representation is, if not eliminated, drastically reduced.
1.1. Outline
We review the description of the certified email protocol in Section 2. We also review
our verification technique, in Section 3, and show how to extend it so as to handle the
correspondence assertions on which we rely here. We explain our formal specification of
the protocol in Section 4, then prove its security properties in Section 5. We conclude in
Section 6, mentioning our work on the analysis of more elaborate variants of the protocol.
1.2. Related work
It is fairly common to reason informally about security protocols, with various degrees
of thoroughness and rigor. For instance, Krawczyk gave some informal arguments about
the properties of the Skeme protocol (a variant of the core of IPsec) when he introduced
Skeme [12]. Similarly, the presentation of the protocol that we treat in this paper included
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informal proof sketches for some of its central properties [2]. Generally, such proofs are
informative, but far from complete and fully reliable.
It has been widely argued that formal proofs are particularly important for security
protocols, because of the seriousness of security flaws. Nevertheless, formal proofs for
substantial, practical protocols remain relatively rare. Next we mention what seem to be
the most relevant results in this area.
The theorem prover Isabelle has been used for verifying (fragments of) several
significant protocols with an inductive method, in particular Kerberos [5,6], TLS (a
descendant of SSL 3.0) [15], and the e-commerce protocol SET [4]. Following the same
general approach, Bella, Longo, and Paulson have recently verified the certified email
protocol that we treat in this paper [3]. They use this protocol as an example of a “second-
level” protocol, that is, a protocol that depends on the security of an underlying protocol
for achieving its goals. Specifically, in the certified email protocol, the receiver and a
trusted third party use a secure channel that can be established with SSH, SSL, or some
other protocol. While we consider three particular implementations of this channel, Bella
et al. reason with assumptions about the security of the channel, independently of any
particular implementation. Moreover, Bella et al. point out a limitation of the certified
email protocol: the protocol does not provide authentication for the sender, so anybody
can simulate (spoof) the sending of a message. In this case, the receiver gets the message
while the sender gets a receipt for a message that it did not send. Although this scenario
does not contradict the security properties that we prove, it is unexpected, and it could be
prevented.
The suggested implementation of the certified email protocol uses a Java applet for
the protocol code of the receiver. Blanchet and Aziz have recently modeled this set-up in
a calculus for security and mobility [9]. Their model exhibits an attack which had been
previously suggested and that occurs when a malicious applet is given to the receiver. The
attack falls outside the scope of the model developed in this paper; here, the code of each
participant is fixed.
The finite-state model checker Murphi has served for the verification of SSL 3.0 [14]
and of contract-signing protocols [17]. Somewhat similarly, Mocha has been used for the
verification of contract-signing protocols within a game model [13]. (Contract-signing
protocols have some high-level similarities to protocols for certified email.) Largely
because of tool characteristics, the proofs in Murphi and Mocha require non-trivial
encodings and simplifications of the protocols under consideration, and of their properties.
Schneider has studied a non-repudiation protocol in a CSP-based model, with manual
proofs [16]. That protocol, which is due to Zhou and Gollmann, has commonalities with
protocols for certified email.
Gordon and Jeffrey have been developing attractive type-based techniques for proving
correspondence assertions of protocols [10,11]. To date, they have had to support only
limited forms of correspondence assertions, and they have included a limited repertoire
of cryptographic primitives. In these respects, their system is insufficient for the protocol
that we treat in this paper, and weaker than the tool that we use. On the other hand, those
limitations are probably not intrinsic.
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2. The protocol
This section recalls the description of the protocol for certified email. This section is
self-contained, but we refer the reader to the original description [2] for additional details
and context.
Protocols for certified email aim to allow a sender, S, to send an email message to a
receiver, R, so that R gets the message if and only if S gets a corresponding return receipt.
Some protocols additionally aim to ensure the confidentiality of the message.
This protocol, like several others, relies on an on-line trusted third party, TTP. For
simplicity, the channels between TTP and the other parties are assumed to guarantee
reliable message delivery. Furthermore, the channel between R and TTP should provide
secrecy and authentication of TTP to R. (These properties are needed when R gives a
password or some other secret to TTP in order to prove its identity.) In practice such
a channel might be an SSL connection or, more generally, a channel protected with
symmetric keys established via a suitable protocol.
The protocol supports several options for authenticating R. For each email, S picks one
of the options; the choice is denoted by authoption. There are four authentication options,
named BothAuth, TTPAuth, SAuth, and NoAuth. As these names suggest, the options
vary in whether TTP, S, both, or neither authenticate R. When the authentication option
requires it, the authentication is done as follows:
• TTP authenticates R using a shared secret RPwd—a password that identifies R to TTP.
• S authenticates R using a query/response mechanism. R is given a query q by the
receiver software and r is the response that S expects R to give.
The protocol relies on a number of cryptographic primitives. The corresponding
notation is as follows. E(k, m) is an encryption of m using key k under some symmetric
encryption algorithm. H(m) is the hash of m in some collision-resistant hashing scheme.
A(k, m) is an encryption of m using key k under some public-key encryption algorithm.
S(k, m) is a signature of m using key k under a public-key signature algorithm. Finally
m1 | · · · | mn denotes the unambiguous concatenation of the mi s.
TTP has a public key TTPEncKey that S can use for encrypting messages for TTP,
and a corresponding secret key TTPDecKey. TTP also has a secret key TTPSigKey that
it can use for signing messages and a public key TTPVerKey that S can use for verifying
these signatures.
In the first step of the protocol, S encrypts its message under a freshly generated
symmetric key, encrypts this key under TTPEncKey, and mails this and the encrypted
message to R. Then R forwards the encrypted key to TTP. After authenticating R
appropriately, TTP releases the key to R (so R can decrypt and read the message) and
sends a receipt to S. In more detail, the exchange of messages goes as follows. (Fig. 1,
adapted from [2], shows some of this detail.)
Step 1: When S wishes to send a message m to R:
1.1. S generates a key k. S also picks authoption. If authoption is BothAuth or SAuth,
then S knows or generates a query q to which R should respond r. If authoption is
TTPAuth or NoAuth, then q and r are null.
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em = E(k, m)
hS = H(cleartext | q | r | em)
S2TTP = A(TTPEncKey, S | authoption | “give k to R for hS”)


S 

R


TTP

1. TTP | em | authoption | cleartext | q | S2TTP

2. S2TTP | “owner of RPwd
wants key for hS”

3. “try k for hS”













4. S(TTPSigKey, “I have released
the key for S2TTP′′. . . ”)
Fig. 1. Protocol sketch.
1.2. S encrypts m with k, letting em = E(k, m).
1.3. S then computes hS = H(cleartext | q | r | em). This hash will both identify the
message to TTP and serve for authenticating R. The part cleartext is simply a header.
1.4. S computes S2TTP = A(TTPEncKey, S | authoption | “give k to R for hS”).
1.5. S sends Message 1:
MESSAGE 1, S to R: TTP | em | authoption | cleartext | q | S2TTP
Step 2: When R receives a message of the form TTP | em′ | authoption′ | cleartext′ |
q′ | S2TTP′:
2.1. R reads cleartext′ and decides whether it wants to read the message with the
assistance of TTP. Assuming that R decides to proceed, R constructs a response
r′ to query q′ if authoption′ is SAuth or BothAuth; R simply uses null for r′ if
authoption′ is TTPAuth or NoAuth. Similarly, R recalls its password RPwd for TTP
if authoption′ is TTPAuth or BothAuth; R simply uses null for RPwd if authoption′
is SAuth or NoAuth.
2.2. R computes hR = H(cleartext′ | q′ | r′ | em′).
2.3. R sends Message 2:
MESSAGE 2, R to TTP: S2TTP′ | “owner of RPwd wants key for hR”
This message and the next one are transmitted on the secure channel that links R and
TTP.
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Steps 3 and 4: When TTP receives of a message of the form S2TTP′′ | “owner of RPwd′
wants key for h′R”:
3.1. TTP tries to decrypt S2TTP′′ using TTPDecKey. The cleartext should be of the form
S | authoption′′ | “give k′ to R′ for h′S” with h′S equal to h′R.
3.2. TTP checks that authoption′′ is SAuth or NoAuth or that RPwd′ is the password for
R′. If TTP’s check succeeds, it proceeds with Messages 3 and 4.
3.3. TTP sends Message 3:
MESSAGE 3, TTP to R: “try k′ for h′R”
Upon receipt of such a message R uses k′ to decrypt em′, obtaining m.
4.1. TTP sends Message 4. If authoption′′ is BothAuth or TTPAuth, it sends:
MESSAGE 4, TTP to S:
S(TTPSigKey, “I have released the key for S2TTP′′ to R′”)
Otherwise, it sends:
MESSAGE 4, TTP to S:
S(TTPSigKey, “I have released the key for S2TTP′′”)
4.2. When S receives Message 4, it checks this receipt. Later on, if the authentication
option was BothAuth or TTPAuth and S wants to prove to a judge that R has received
m, S can provide this message, em, k, cleartext, q, and r, and the judge should check
that these values and TTP’s public key match.
3. The verification tool
In this section we review the verification tool that we employ for our analysis (see [1,7,8]
for further information). We also explain how we extend this tool.
The tool requires expressing protocols in a formal language, which we describe below.
The semantics of this language is the point of reference for our proofs. The tool is sound,
with respect to this semantics. (So proofs with the tool can guarantee the absence of attacks
captured in this semantics, but not necessarily of other attacks.) On the other hand, the tool
is not complete; however, it is successful in substantial proofs, as we demonstrate.
3.1. The input language
The verifier takes as input the description of a protocol in a little programming language,
an extension of the pi calculus. This calculus represents messages by terms M, N, . . .,
and programs by processes P, Q, . . .. Identifiers are partitioned into names, variables,
constructors, and destructors. We often use a, b, and c for names, x for a variable, f
for a constructor, and g for a destructor.
Constructors are functions that serve for building terms. Thus, the terms are variables,
names, and constructor applications of the form f (M1, . . . , Mn). A constructor f of arity
n is introduced with the declaration fun f/n. On the other hand, destructors do not appear
in terms, but only manipulate terms in processes. They are partial functions on terms that
processes can apply. The process let x = g(M1, . . . , Mn) in P else Q tries to evaluate
g(M1, . . . , Mn); if this succeeds, then x is bound to the result and P is run; else Q is
run. More precisely, a destructor g of arity n is described with a set of reduction rules of
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the form g(M1, . . . , Mn) → M where M1, . . . , Mn , M are terms without free names.
These reduction rules are specified in a reduc declaration. We extend these rules by
g(M ′1, . . . , M ′n) → M ′ if and only if there exists a substitution σ and a reduction rule
g(M1, . . . , Mn) → M in the declaration of g such that M ′i = σ Mi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
and M ′ = σ M . Pairing and encryption are typical constructors; projections and decryption
are typical destructors. More generally, we can represent data structures and cryptographic
operations using constructors and destructors, as can be seen below in our coding of the
protocol for certified email.
The process calculus includes auxiliary events that are useful in specifying security
properties. The process begin(M).P executes the event begin(M), then P . The process
end(M).P executes the event end(M), then P . We prove security properties of the form
“if a certain end event has been executed, then certain begin events have been executed”.
Most other constructs of the language come from the pi calculus. The input process
in(M, x); P inputs a message on channel M , then runs P with the variable x bound
to the input message. The output process out(M, N); P outputs the message N on the
channel M , then runs P . The nil process 0 does nothing. The process P | Q is the parallel
composition of P and Q. The replication !P represents an unbounded number of copies
of P in parallel. The restriction new a; P creates a new name a, then executes P . The let
definition let x = M in P runs P with x bound to M , and if M = N then P else Q runs
P when M equals N ; otherwise it runs Q. As usual, we may omit an else clause when it
consists of 0.
The name a is bound in the process new a; P . The variable x is bound in P in the
processes in(M, x); P , let x = g(M1, . . . , Mn) in P else Q, and let x = M in P . We write
fn(P) and fv(P) for the sets of names and variables free in P , respectively. A process is
closed if it has no free variables; it may have free names. Processes that represent complete
protocols are always closed.
The formal semantics of this language can be defined by a reduction relation on
configurations, as explained in the appendix. (This semantics, as well as the proof method,
have evolved in minor ways since previous publications [8].) A reduction trace is a finite
sequence of reduction steps.
We generally assume that processes execute in the presence of an adversary, which is
itself a process in the same calculus. The adversary need not be programmed explicitly; we
usually establish results with respect to all adversaries. We need only constrain the initial
knowledge of the adversary, which we represent with a set of names Init, and restrict the
adversary not to use auxiliary events:
Definition 1. Let Init be a finite set of names. The closed process Q is an Init-adversary if
and only if fn(Q) ⊆ Init and Q does not contain begin or end events.
3.2. The internal representation and the proof engine
Given a protocol expressed as a process in the input language, the verifier first translates
it, automatically, into a set of Horn clauses (logic programming rules).
In the rules, messages are represented by patterns, which are expressions similar to
terms except that names a are replaced with functions a[. . .]. A free name a is replaced
with the function without parameter a[] (or simply a), while a bound name is replaced
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with a function of inputs above the restriction that creates the name. The rules are written
in terms of four kinds of facts:
• attacker(p) means that the adversary may have the message p;
• mess(p, p′) means that the message p′ may be sent on channel p;
• begin(p) means that the event begin(p) may have been executed;
• end(p) means that the event end(p) may have been executed.
The verifier uses a resolution-based solving algorithm in order to determine properties
of the protocol. Specifically, it implements a function solveP,Init(F) that takes as
parameters the protocol P , the initial knowledge of the adversary Init, and a fact F ,
and returns a set of Horn clauses. This function first translates the protocol into a set of
Horn clauses C, then saturates this set using a resolution-based algorithm [8, Sections 4.2
and 4.3]. Finally, this function determines what is derivable. More precisely, let F ′ be an
instance of F . Let Cb be any set of closed facts begin(p). We can show that the fact F ′ is
derivable from C∪Cb if and only if there exist a clause F1 ∧. . .∧Fn → F0 in solveP,Init(F)
and a substitution σ such that F ′ = σ F0 and σ F1, . . . , σ Fn are derivable from C ∪ Cb.
In particular, when solveP,Init(F) = ∅, no instance of F is derivable. Other values of
solveP,Init(F) give information on which instances of F are derivable, and under which
conditions. In particular, the begin facts in the hypotheses of the clauses in solveP,Init(F)
indicate which begin facts must be in Cb in order to prove F ′, that is, which begin events
must be executed.
3.3. Secrecy
In the input language, we define secrecy in terms of the communications of a process
that executes in parallel with an arbitrary attacker. This treatment of secrecy is a fairly
direct adaptation of our earlier one [1], with a generalization from free names to terms.
Definition 2 (Secrecy). Let P be a closed process and M a term such that fn(M) ⊆ fn(P).
The process P preserves the secrecy of all instances of M from Init if and only if for any
Init-adversary Q, any c ∈ fn(Q), and any substitution σ , no reduction trace of P | Q
executes out(c, σ M).
The following result provides a method for proving secrecy properties:
Theorem 1 (Secrecy). Let P be a closed process. Let M be a term such that fn(M) ⊆
fn(P). Let p be the pattern obtained by replacing names a with patterns a[] in the term M.
Assume that solveP,Init(attacker(p)) = ∅. Then P preserves the secrecy of all instances of
M from Init.
Basically, this result says that if the fact attacker(p) is not derivable then the adversary
cannot obtain the term M that corresponds to p.
3.4. Correspondence assertions
As shown in [8], the verifier can serve for establishing correspondence assertions [18]
of the restricted form “if end(M) has been executed, then begin(M) must have been
executed”. Here, we extend this technique so as to prove specifications of the more
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general form “if end(N) has been executed, then begin(M1), . . . , begin(Ml ) must have
been executed”, and even more generally “if end(N) has been executed, then there exists
some i such that begin(Mi1), . . . , begin(Mili ) must have been executed”. De-emphasizing
technical differences with Woo’s and Lam’s definitions, we refer to these specifications as
correspondence assertions. Below, we use correspondence assertions for establishing that
R gets S’s message if and only if S gets a corresponding receipt.
We define the meaning of these specifications as follows:
Definition 3 (Correspondence). Let P be a closed process and N, Mij for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and j ∈ {1, . . . , li } be terms whose free names are among the free names of P . The process
P satisfies the correspondence assertion
end(N) 
n∨
i=1
begin(Mi1), . . . , begin(Mili )
with respect to Init-adversaries if and only if, for any Init-adversary Q, for any σ defined
on the variables of N , if end(σ N) is executed in some reduction trace of P | Q, then there
exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that we can extend σ so that for k ∈ {1, . . . , li }, begin(σ Mik ) is
executed in this trace as well.
Analogously to Theorem 1, the next theorem provides a method for proving these
correspondence assertions with our verifier.
Theorem 2 (Correspondence). Let P be a closed process and N, Mij for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and j ∈ {1, . . . , li } be terms whose free names are among the free names of P. Let p, pi j
be the patterns obtained by replacing each name a with the corresponding pattern a[] in
the terms N, Mij respectively. Assume that, for all rules R in solveP,Init(end(p)), there
exist i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, σ ′, and H such that R = H ∧ begin(σ ′ pi1) ∧ . . . ∧ begin(σ ′ pili ) →
end(σ ′ p). Then P satisfies the correspondence assertion
end(N) 
n∨
i=1
begin(Mi1), . . . , begin(Mili )
with respect to Init-adversaries.
Intuitively, the condition on R means that, for the fact end(σ ′ p) to be derivable,
begin(σ ′ pi1), . . . , begin(σ ′ pili ) must be derivable for some i . The conclusion of the
theorem is the corresponding statement on events: if end(σ N) has been executed, then
begin(σ Mi1), . . . , begin(σ Mili ) must have been executed as well for some i .
4. Formalizing the protocol
In order to analyze the protocol for certified email, we program it in the verifier’s input
language, following the informal specification rather closely. In the code below, comments
such as “Step 1.1” refer to corresponding steps of the informal specification.
The code represents the situation in which all principals proceed honestly. In Section 5,
when we consider situations in which S or R are adversarial and may therefore not execute
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this code, we simplify the specification accordingly. In addition, in order to specify and
prove security properties, we add events (at the program points marked Event S, Event R,
Event TTP, and Event TTP’).
(* Public-key cryptography *)
fun pk/1.
fun A/2.
reduc decA(y, A(pk(y), x)) = x .
(* Signatures *)
fun S/2.
fun Spk/1.
reduc checkS(Spk(y), S(y, x)) = x .
reduc getS(S(y, x)) = x .
(* Shared-key cryptography *)
fun E/2.
reduc decE(y, E(y, x)) = x .
(* Hash function *)
fun H/1.
(* Constants to identify messages *)
fun Give/0. fun Wants/0. fun Try/0. fun Released/0.
(* Constant authentication modes *)
fun Auth/0. fun NoAuth/0.
(* Null constant *)
fun null/0.
(* Function used to handle the various authentication modes *)
reduc getAuth(q, NoAuth) = null;
getAuth(q, Auth) = q .
(* Function from R’s password to R’s name *)
fun PasswdTable/1.
(* It is assumed that an attacker cannot relate q and r = Reply(h, q) except for
the hosts h it creates itself *)
private fun Reply/2.
reduc ReplyOwnHost(x, q) = Reply(PasswdTable(x), q).
(* Build a message *)
private fun Message/3.
(* Secrecy assumptions *)
not TTPDecKey.
not TTPSigKey.
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(* Free names (public and private constants) *)
free c, cleartext, Sname, TTPname.
private free TTPDecKey, TTPSigKey, RPwd.
let processS =
(* The attacker chooses possible recipients of the message *)
in(c, recipient);
(* The attacker chooses the authentication mode *)
in(c, (sauth, ttpauth));
(* Build the message to send *)
new msgid; let m = Message(recipient, msgid, (sauth, ttpauth)) in
(* Step 1.1 *)
new k;
new qtmp;
let q = getAuth(qtmp, sauth) in
let r = getAuth(Reply(recipient, qtmp), sauth) in
(* Step 1.2 *)
let em = E(k, m) in
(* Step 1.3 *)
let hs = H((cleartext, q, r, em)) in
(* Step 1.4 *)
let S2TTP = A(TTPEncKey, (Sname, (sauth, ttpauth),
(Give, k, recipient, hs))) in
(* Event S [to be added later] *)
(* Step 1.5 *)
out(recipient, (TTPname, em, (sauth, ttpauth), cleartext, q, S2TTP)));
(* Step 4.2 *)
!
in(Sname, mess4);
if ttpauth = Auth then
(
let (= Released,= S2TTP,= recipient) = checkS(TTPVerKey, mess4) in
(* S knows that the recipient has read the message *)
end(SthinksRhas(m))
else out(Sname, mess4)
) else (
let (= Released,= S2TTP) = checkS(TTPVerKey, mess4) in
(* S knows that somebody has read the message *)
end(SthinksRhas(m))
else out(Sname, mess4)
).
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let processR =
(* Step 2 *)
in(Rname, (= TTPname, em2, (sauth, ttpauth), cleartext2, q2, S2TTP2));
(* Step 2.1 *)
let r2 = getAuth(Reply(Rname, q2), sauth) in
(* Step 2.2 *)
let hr = H((cleartext2, q2, r2, em2)) in
(* Establish the secure channel R-TTP *)
new secchannel;
out(ChannelToTTP, Rname);
out(ChannelToTTP, secchannel);
let outchannel = (TTPname, secchannel) in
let inchannel = (Rname, secchannel) in
(* Event R [to be added later] *)
(* Step 2.3 *)
out(outchannel, (S2TTP2, (Wants, getAuth(RPwd, ttpauth), hr)));
(* Step 3.3 *)
!
in(inchannel, (= Try, k3,= hr));
let m3 = decE(k3, em2) in
(* R has obtained the message m3 = m *)
end(Rreceived(m3)).
let processTTP =
(* Establish the secure channel R-TTP *)
in(ChannelToTTP, receivername);
in(ChannelToTTP, secchannel);
let inchannel = (TTPname, secchannel) in
let outchannel = (receivername, secchannel) in
(* Step 3 *)
in(inchannel, (S2TTP3, (= Wants, RPwd3, hr3)));
(* Step 3.1 *)
let (Sname3, (sauth3, ttpauth3), (= Give, k3, R3,= hr3)) =
decA(TTPDecKey, S2TTP3) in
(* Step 3.2 *)
if R3 = receivername then
(
if (ttpauth3, R3) = (Auth, PasswdTable(RPwd3)) then
(* Event TTP [to be added later] *)
(* Step 3.3 *)
out(outchannel, (Try, k3, hr3));
(* Step 4.1 *)
out(Sname3, S(TTPSigKey, (Released, S2TTP3, R3)))
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else if ttpauth3 = NoAuth then
(* Event TTP’ [to be added later] *)
(* Step 3.3 *)
out(outchannel, (Try, k3, hr3));
(* Step 4.1 *)
out(Sname3, S(TTPSigKey, (Released, S2TTP3)))
).
process
let TTPEncKey = pk(TTPDecKey) in out(c, TTPEncKey);
let TTPVerKey = Spk(TTPSigKey) in out(c, TTPVerKey);
let Rname = PasswdTable(RPwd) in out(c, Rname);
new ChannelToTTP;
((!processS) | (!processR) | (!processTTP)
| (!in(c, m); out(ChannelToTTP, m)))
This code first declares cryptographic primitives. For instance, the constructor A is the
public-key encryption function, which takes two parameters, a public key and a cleartext,
and returns a ciphertext. The constructor pk computes a public key from a secret key. The
destructor decA is the corresponding decryption function. From a ciphertext A(pk(y), x)
and the corresponding secret key y, it returns the cleartext x . Hence we give the rule
decA(y, A(pk(y), x)) = x . We assume perfect cryptography, so the cleartext can be
obtained from the ciphertext only when one has the decryption key. We define signatures,
shared-key encryption, and a hash function analogously. Note that the constructor Spk
that builds a public key for signatures from a secret key is different from the constructor
pk that builds a public key for encryptions. The destructor checkS checks the signature,
while getS returns the cleartext message without checking the signature. (In particular,
the adversary may use getS in order to obtain message contents from signed messages.)
Concatenation is represented by tuples, which are pre-declared by default. We also declare
a number of constants that appear in messages.
The four authentication modes are encoded as pairs built from the two constants
Auth and NoAuth. The first component of a pair indicates whether S authenticates
R, while the second one indicates whether TTP authenticates R. Thus, BothAuth is
encoded as (Auth, Auth), SAuth as (Auth, NoAuth), TTPAuth as (NoAuth, Auth), and
NoAuth as (NoAuth, NoAuth). This encoding makes it easier to tell whether S or TTP
should authenticate R. In the protocol, several message components are null when no
authentication is done, while they take another value when some authentication is required.
The function getAuth serves for handling such situations: it takes as arguments the value q
when authentication is required and the authentication status NoAuth or Auth, and returns
the value to use, either null or q .
The constructor PasswdTable computes the name of a receiver from its password, and
represents the password table (host name, host password). Since all host names are public
but some passwords are secret, the adversary must not be able to compute the appropriate
password from a host name, so we define a function that maps passwords to host names
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but not the converse: host name = PasswdTable(host password). One advantage of this
encoding is that we can compactly model systems with an unbounded number of hosts.
The challenge–response authentication of R by S goes as follows. S creates an
arbitrary query q , and the reply r to this query is computed by the constructor Reply,
so r = Reply(h, q) where h is the recipient host name. Both S and R can use the
constructor Reply. However, this constructor is declared private, that is, the adversary
cannot apply it. (Otherwise, it could impersonate R.) The adversary must be able to
compute replies for hosts that it creates, that is, when it has the password of the host.
Therefore, we define a public destructor ReplyOwnHost that computes a reply from the
query and the password of the host.
The constructor Message builds the messages that S sends to R. We assume that these
messages are initially secret, so we make the constructor private. We also assume that S
sends different messages when the recipient or the authentication option differ, so let a
message be a function of the recipient, of a message identifier, and of the authentication
mode.
Secrecy assumptions correspond to an optimization of our verifier. The declaration
not M indicates to the verifier that M is secret. The verifier can then use this information
in order to speed up the solving process. At the end of solving, the verifier checks that the
secrecy assumption is actually true, so that a wrong secrecy assumption leads to an error
message but not to an incorrect result.
The declaration free declares public free names. c is a public channel, cleartext is the
header of the messages sent by S, and Sname and TTPname are the names of S and
TTP, respectively. R’s name is Rname = PasswdTable(RPwd) so it not a free name.
(It is declared at the end of the protocol.) The declaration private free declares private
free names (not known by the adversary); TTPDecKey and TTPSigKey are TTP’s secret
keys, and RPwd is R’s password.
The processes processS, processR, and processTTP represent S, R, and TTP,
respectively. These processes are composed in the last part of the protocol specification.
This part computes TTP’s public encryption key from its secret key by means of the
constructor pk: TTPEncKey = pk(TTPDecKey). The public key TTPEncKey is output
on the public channel c so that the adversary can have TTPEncKey. We proceed similarly
for the key pair (TTPSigKey, TTPVerKey). At last, we compute R’s name from its
password: Rname = PasswdTable(RPwd). This name is public, so we send it on
channel c, so that the adversary can have it. In the following, we use Rname as an
abbreviation for the term PasswdTable(RPwd). The role of ChannelToTTP and of the
last element of the parallel composition is explained below in the description of processR.
The process processS first receives the name of the host to which S is going to send
its message, on the public channel c. Thus, the adversary can choose that host. This
conservative assumption implies that S can send its message to any host. Similarly,
processS receives the authentication mode to be used for this message. Then S builds
the message: it creates a new message id msgid, and builds the message m by calling the
constructor Message. Then it executes the steps of the protocol description. For instance,
in step 1.1, it creates a new key k by means of new k and a new query qtmp by means
of new qtmp. It computes q by setting it to qtmp when S authenticates R and to null
otherwise, using the function getAuth. Similarly, it computes the corresponding reply, and
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sets r either to the value of this reply or to null using the function getAuth. In step 1.4, the
sentence “give k to recipient for hs” is represented by a tuple containing the constant Give
and the parameters k, recipient, and hs. Other sentences are represented analogously. Note
that, at step 1.5, we send the message to the recipient on channel recipient. In our coding of
the protocol, the channel always indicates the destination of the message. This indication
makes it easier to define the meaning of “a message reaches its destination”, but it is only
an indication: when the channel is public, the adversary may still obtain the message or
send its own messages on the channel. In the destructor application of step 4.2, we use
a pattern-matching construct: let (= Released,= S2TTP,= recipient) = . . . in . . .. A
pattern (p1, . . . , pn) matches a tuple of arity n, when p1, . . . , pn match the components
of the tuple. A pattern x matches any term, and binds x to this term. A pattern = M
matches only the term M . So the destructor application of step 4.2 succeeds if and only
if mess4 = S(TTPSigKey, (Released, S2TTP, recipient)). The same pattern-matching
construct is used for message input. When the check of mess4 fails, the incoming message
mess4 is returned on the channel Sname (by the else clause of the destructor application),
so that another session of S can get it. We assume that the execution is fair, so that all
sessions of S get a chance to have the receipt mess4. Moreover, because of the replication
at the beginning of step 4.2, S still waits for a receipt from TTP even after receiving a
wrong receipt. In an actual implementation, S would store a set of the messages it has
sent recently and for which it has not yet obtained a receipt. When obtaining a receipt, it
would look for the corresponding message in this set. Our coding represents this lookup by
returning the receipt on Sname until it is consumed by the right session of S. When the
receipt has been successfully checked, S executes the event end(SthinksRhas(m)). This
event, which is used below in the proofs, indicates that somebody has read the message;
the guarantees on who has read the message depend on the authentication mode.
The process processR first executes steps 2.1 and 2.2, then it establishes a secure
connection with TTP. The informal specification does not spell out the details related to
this connection, so we need to pick them. Several reasonable choices are available; we
explore one here and mention others in Section 6. In order to establish the connection
with TTP, R employs an asymmetric channel ChannelToTTP (created at the end
of the protocol description) on which anybody can write but only TTP can read.
For starting a connection with TTP, one sends its own name receivername (here
Rname) and a new name secchannel on ChannelToTTP. Further exchanges between
R and TTP are then done on channels (TTPname, secchannel) from R to TTP and
(receivername, secchannel) from TTP to R. We use pairs for channels so as to mention
explicitly the destination host in the channel name. One might see some similarity
with TCP connections, in which packets contain destination addresses. Since the name
secchannel created by R is secret, only R and TTP will be able to send or receive messages
on (TTPname, secchannel) and (receivername, secchannel), so the channel between R
and TTP is indeed secure. This channel provides authentication of TTP, since only TTP
can read on ChannelToTTP. Any host can send messages on ChannelToTTP, and thus
start a connection with TTP. So the authentication of R is provided not by the channel
but by the password check that TTP performs (in step 3.2). R writes on that channel,
TTP reads on it. In order to allow the adversary to write on that channel, we use a relay
process (!in(c, m); out(ChannelToTTP, m)) (last line of the protocol description) that
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gets a message on c and resends it on ChannelToTTP. Thus, by sending a message on
c, the adversary can send it on ChannelToTTP. After establishing the connection with
TTP, R continues the execution of steps 2.3 and 3.3. In the end, R executes the event
Rreceived(m3), to note that R has correctly received the message m3. Below, this event is
useful in the security proofs.
The process processTTP first establishes a secure channel with a message recipient, as
explained above. Then it executes step 3. Note that, at the beginning of step 3.2, it checks
that its interlocutor in the connection, receivername, actually corresponds to the expected
receiver of the message, R3. This check ensures that the message on outchannel goes to
the expected receiver of the message. Finally, TTP sends the key k3 to the receiver of the
message (step 3.3) and the receipt to the sender (step 4.1).
5. Results
In this section we present the proofs of the main security properties of the protocol. We
rely heavily on the verifier for these proofs.
5.1. Secrecy
Let P0 be the process that represents the protocol. The verifier can prove automatically
that this process preserves the secrecy of the message m sent by S to R when R is
authenticated by at least one party, S or TTP.
Proposition 1. Let Init = {Sname, TTPname, c, cleartext}. The process P0 preserves
the secrecy of all instances of Message(Rname, i, a) from Init, when a is (Auth, z) or
(z, Auth).
Automatic proof. We give the appropriate queries attacker(Message(Rname, i, (Auth,
z))) and attacker(Message(Rname, i, (z, Auth))). For each of these two queries F , the
tool computes solveP0,Init(F) = ∅. Hence, by Theorem 1, the process P0 preserves the
secrecy of Message(Rname, i, a) from Init, when a is (Auth, z) or (z, Auth). 
When R is not authenticated, on the other hand, an attacker may impersonate R in order
to obtain the message, so secrecy does not hold.
5.2. Receipt
The main correctness property of the protocol is the following: when TTP authenticates
R, R receives the message m if and only if S gets a proof that R has received the message.
This proof should be such that, if S goes to a judge with it, the judge can definitely say that
R has received the message.
This property holds only when the delivery of messages is guaranteed on the channels
from TTP to R, from TTP to S, and from S to the judge; hence the following definition.
Definition 4. We say that a message m sent on channel c reaches its destination if and
only if it is eventually received by an input on channel c in the initial process P0 or a
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process derived from P0. If the adversary receives the message, it re-emits the message on
channel c.
Furthermore, we use the following fairness hypotheses:
• If a reduction step can be executed infinitely often, then it will eventually be executed.
• If a message m is sent on channel c, and some inputs on channel c re-emit it, that is, they
execute in(c, m) . . . out(c, m), and some do not re-emit m on c, then m will eventually
be received by an input that does not re-emit it.
Although this definition and these hypotheses are stated somewhat informally, they can be
made precise in terms of the semantics of the language. Several variants are possible.
The fact that messages reach their destination and the fairness hypotheses cannot be
taken into account by our verifier, so it cannot prove the required properties in a fully
automatic way. Still, the verifier can prove a correspondence assertion that constitutes the
most important part of the proof. Indeed, we have to show properties of the form: if some
event e1 has been executed, then some event e2 has or will be executed. The verifier shows
automatically the correspondence assertion: if e1 has been executed, then some events e′2
have been executed before e1. We show manually that if the events e′2 have been executed,
then e2 will be executed after e′2. Thus the correspondence assertion captures the desired
security property. The manual proof just consists in following the execution steps of the
process after e′2. It is much simpler than the first part, which should go backward through
all possible execution histories leading to e1. Fortunately, the first part is fully automatic.
We use the following process to represent the judge to which the informal specification
of the protocol alludes:
fun Received/0.
free Judgename.
let processJudge =
(* S must send TTP’s certificate plus other information *)
in(Judgename, (certif , Sname5, k5, cleartext5, q5, r5, em5));
let (= Released, S2TTP5, Rname5) = checkS(TTPVerKey, certif ) in
let m5 = decE(k5, em5) in
let hs5 = H((cleartext5, q5, r5, em5)) in
let give5 = (Give, k5, Rname5, hs5) in
if S2TTP5 = A(TTPEncKey, (Sname5, (Auth, Auth), give5))
or S2TTP5 = A(TTPEncKey, (Sname5, (NoAuth, Auth), give5)) then
(* The judge says that Rname5 has received m5 *)
end(JudgeSays(Received, Rname5, m5)).
According to this process definition, the judge receives a certificate from S, tries to check
it, and if it succeeds, says that the receiver has received the message; the judge says
something only when the authentication option is of the form (_, Auth), that is, when
TTP authenticates R. This process is executed in parallel with processR, processTTP, and
processS. At the end of processS, after executing end(SthinksRhas(m)) when ttpauth =
Auth, the sender S sends to the judge
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out(Judgename, (mess4, Sname, k, cleartext, q, r, em))
The result to prove decomposes into two propositions, Propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition 2. Assume that the messages from TTP sent on Sname3 and from S sent on
Judgename reach their destinations. If TTP authenticates R and R has received m, then
the judge says that R has received m.
In this proof, R is included in the adversary: R tries to get a message without S having
the corresponding receipt. So we need not constrain R to follow the protocol. The process
for R becomes
out(c, ChannelToTTP); out(c, RPwd) | in(c, m); end(Rreceived(m))
This process reveals all the information that R has. When the adversary obtains some
message m, it can send it on c, and thus execute the event end(Rreceived(m)). Since
R is included in the adversary, the adversary can compute the constructor Reply, so its
declaration becomes: fun Reply/2. Writing P0 for the resulting process that represents the
whole system, the proposition becomes, more formally:
Proposition 2′. Assume that the messages from TTP sent on Sname3 and from S sent on
Judgename reach their destinations. Let Init = {Sname, TTPname, Judgename, c,
cleartext}. For any Init-adversary Q, if the event end(Rreceived(Message(Mx, Mi, (Mz,
Auth)))) is executed in a reduction trace of P0 | Q for some terms Mx, Mi, and Mz,
then end(JudgeSays(Received, Mx, Message(Mx, Mi, (Mz, Auth)))) is executed in all
continuations of this trace.
At point Event TTP, we introduce the event begin(TTP_send(Sname3, S(TTPSigKey,
(Released, S2TTP3, R3)))) to note that TTP sends the receipt S(TTPSigKey,
(Released, S2TTP3, R3)) to S. At point Event S, we introduce the event begin(S_has
(Sname, k, cleartext, q, r, m)) to note that S has all parameters needed to obtain the
answer from the judge (except TTP’s receipt).
Automatic part of the proof. We invoke our tool with the query end(Rreceived
(Message(x, i, (z, Auth)))), to determine under which conditions an instance of the
corresponding event may be executed. The tool then computes the set of clauses
solveP0,Init(end(Rreceived(Message(x, i, (z, Auth))))) and returns two clauses, both of
the form:
begin(TTP_send(Sname, S(TTPSigKey, (Released, A(TTPEncKey,
(Sname, (pz, Auth), (Give, pk, px, H((cleartext, pq, pr,
E(pk, Message(px, pi, (pz, Auth)))))))), px))))∧
begin(S_has(Sname, pk, cleartext, pq, pr, Message(px, pi, (pz, Auth))))∧
H → end(Rreceived(Message(px, pi, (pz, Auth))))
for some patterns px, pk, pq, pr, pi, pz, and some hypothesis H . (These clauses concern
pz = NoAuth and pz = Auth respectively.)
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So, by Theorem 2, if end(Rreceived(Message(Mx, Mi, (Mz, Auth)))) is executed in a
trace of P0 | Q, then the events
begin(TTP_send(Sname, certificate))
begin(S_has(Sname, Mk, cleartext, Mq, Mr, Message(Mx, Mi, (Mz, Auth))))
are executed in this trace for some terms Mk, Mq, and Mr , with certificate =
S(TTPSigKey, (Released, A(TTPEncKey, (Sname, (Mz, Auth), (Give, Mk, Mx,
H((cleartext, Mq, Mr, E(Mk, Message(Mx, Mi, (Mz, Auth)))))))), Mx)).
Manual part of the proof. Since TTP executes begin(TTP_send(Sname, certificate)) as
proved above, it is then going to execute out(Sname, certificate). Since this message
reaches its destination, it will then be received by an input on Sname from P0, that is, by
the last input of processS. Moreover, the session that has executed begin(S_has(Sname,
Mk, cleartext, Mq, Mr, Message(Mx, Mi, (Mz, Auth)))) does not re-emit this message,
so by the fairness hypothesis, this message will be received by a session of S that does
not re-emit it. Such a session successfully checks the certificate and sends it to the judge
on the channel Judgename. Since this message reaches its destination, it will be received
by the input on Judgename in processJudge. Then the judge also checks successfully the
certificate (the check always succeeds when S’s check succeeds), so the judge executes
end(JudgeSays(Received, Mx, Message(Mx, Mi, (Mz, Auth)))). 
The verifier proves the required correspondence assertion in a fully automatic way. It is
then only a few lines of proof to obtain the desired security property. Moreover, we need
not even know in advance the exact correspondence assertion to consider: the verifier tells
us which correspondence assertion holds for the given end event.
Turning to the guarantees for R, we establish:
Proposition 3. Assume that the message from TTP sent on outchannel reaches its
destination. If the judge says that R has received m, then R has received m.
In this proof, S is included in the adversary: S may try to fool the judge into saying
that R has received a message it does not have. Therefore, we need not be specific on how
S behaves, so the process for S is simply 0. The adversary can compute the constructor
Reply, so its declaration becomes: fun Reply/2. Writing P0 for the resulting process that
represents the whole system, the proposition becomes, more formally:
Proposition 3′. Assume that the message from TTP sent on outchannel reaches its
destination. Let Init = {Sname, TTPname, Judgename, c, cleartext}. For any Init-
adversary Q, if end(JudgeSays(Received, Rname, Mm)) is executed in a reduction trace
of P0 | Q for some term Mm, then the event end(Rreceived(Mm)) is executed in all
continuations of this trace.
At point Event R, we introduce the event begin(R_has(secchannel, em2, hr)) to note
that R has received the encrypted message. At point Event TTP, we introduce the event
begin(TTP_send(outchannel, (Try, k3, hr3))) to note that TTP sends the key k3 to R.
Automatic part of the proof. We invoke our verifier with the query end(JudgeSays
(Received, Rname, m)). The tool then computes the set of clauses solveP0,Init(end
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(JudgeSays(Received, Rname, m))) and returns four clauses (one for each authentication
option), all of the form:
begin(TTP_send((Rname, psecchannel), (Try, k, phr)))∧
begin(R_has(psecchannel, E(k, m), phr))∧
H → end(JudgeSays(Received, Rname, m))
for some patterns phr and psecchannel, and some hypothesis H . So, by Theorem 2, if the
event end(JudgeSays(Received, Rname, Mm)) is executed in a reduction trace of P0 | Q
for some term Mm, then the events
begin(R_has(Msecchannel, E(Mk, Mm), Mhr))
begin(TTP_send((Rname, Msecchannel), (Try, Mk, Mhr)))
are executed in this trace for some terms Mk , Msecchannel, and Mhr .
Manual part of the proof. Since TTP executes
begin(TTP_send((Rname, Msecchannel), (Try, Mk, Mhr)))
it will execute out((Rname, Msecchannel), (Try, Mk, Mhr)). This message reaches its
destination, so it will be received by an input derived from P0. The only input that
can receive on (Rname, ...) is the last input of R. Since the value of Msecchannel must
correspond, the session of R that receives this message is also the one that executed
begin(R_has(Msecchannel, E(Mk, Mm), Mhr)). Then this session of R is going to execute
begin(Rreceived(Mm)), as expected.
Note that the replication in R ensures that the input is always possible, even if
the adversary managed to send some “garbage” on the channel (Rname, Msecchannel).
In fact, the adversary does not have Msecchannel so it cannot send on the channel
(Rname, Msecchannel); by proving this fact we could remove the replication. On the other
hand, the replication is needed in certain implementations of the secure channel between
R and TTP, so we have included it in our coding of the protocol. 
When TTP does not authenticate R, a dishonest S could impersonate R in order to
obtain the receipt. Thus, the above results cannot be extended to this case. However, we can
still prove weaker properties. The first one states that if somebody has received a message
sent by S (and S is honest), then S is going to receive a receipt that it can check but which
is not necessarily convincing for a judge that does not trust S.
Proposition 4. Assume that the message from TTP sent on Sname3 reaches its destination.
If R has received m, then S receives a corresponding receipt.
As in the proof of Proposition 2, R is included in the adversary, so the process for R
becomes
out(c, ChannelToTTP); out(c, RPwd) | in(c, m); end(Rreceived(m))
and Reply is declared by fun Reply/2. Writing P0 for the resulting process, the
proposition becomes, more formally:
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Proposition 4′. Assume that the message from TTP sent on Sname3 reaches its destina-
tion. Let Init = {Sname, TTPname, Judgename, c, cleartext}. For any Init-adversary
Q, if the event end(Rreceived(Message(Mx, Mi, Mz))) is executed in a reduction trace
of P0 | Q for some terms Mx, Mi, and Mz, then end(SthinksRhas(Message(Mx, Mi,
Mz))) is executed in all continuations of this trace.
We introduce the following events: at point Event TTP, we add the event
begin(TTP_send(Sname3, S(TTPSigKey, (Released, S2TTP3, R3)))), at point Event
TTP’, we add begin(TTP_send(Sname3, S(TTPSigKey, (Released, S2TTP3)))), and at
point Event S, we add begin(S_has(Sname, k, cleartext, q, r, m)).
Automatic part of the proof. We invoke our tool with the query end(Rreceived
(Message(x, i, z))). The tool then computes the set of clauses solveP0,Init(end(Rreceived
(Message(x, i, z)))) and returns four clauses (one for each authentication option). Two
clauses are of the form
begin(TTP_send(Sname, S(TTPSigKey, (Released, A(TTPEncKey,
(Sname, (p′z, Auth), (Give, pk, px, H((cleartext, pq, pr,
E(pk, Message(px, pi, (p′z, Auth)))))))), px))))∧
begin(S_has(Sname, pk, cleartext, pq, pr, Message(px, pi, (p′z, Auth))))∧
H → end(Rreceived(Message(px, pi, (p′z, Auth))))
and two are of the form
begin(TTP_send(Sname, S(TTPSigKey, (Released, A(TTPEncKey,
(Sname, (p′z, NoAuth), (Give, pk, px, H((cleartext, pq, pr,
E(pk, Message(px, pi, (p′z, NoAuth))))))))))))∧
begin(S_has(Sname, pk, cleartext, pq, pr, Message(px, pi, (p′z, NoAuth))))∧
H → end(Rreceived(Message(px, pi, (p′z, NoAuth))))
for some patterns px, pk, pq, pr, pi, p′z, and some hypothesis H .
So, by Theorem 2, if end(Rreceived(Message(Mx, Mi, Mz))) is executed in a trace of
P0 | Q, then the events
begin(TTP_send(Sname, certificate))
begin(S_has(Sname, Mk, cleartext, Mq, Mr, Message(Mx, Mi, Mz)))
are executed in this trace for some terms Mk , Mq, and Mr , with S2TTP = A(TTPEncKey,
(Sname,Mz,(Give, Mk, Mx, H((cleartext, Mq, Mr, E(Mk, Message(Mx, Mi, Mz)))))))
and either certificate = S(TTPSigKey, (Released, S2TTP, Mx)) and Mz = (_, Auth),
or certificate = S(TTPSigKey, (Released, S2TTP)) and Mz = (_, NoAuth).
Manual part of the proof. The manual proof is quite similar to the beginning of
the proof of Proposition 2′. Much as in that proof, we have that TTP executes
out(Sname, certificate). Since this message reaches its destination, it will be received
by the last input of processS. Moreover, the session that executes begin(S_has(Sname,
Mk, cleartext, Mq, Mr, Message(Mx, Mi, Mz))) does not re-emit this message (in both
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cases mentioned above), so by the fairness hypothesis, this message will be received by a
session of S that does not re-emit it. Such a session successfully checks the certificate and
executes end(SthinksRhas(Message(Mx, Mi, Mz))). 
A further property says that if S authenticates R, and S receives a correct receipt, then
R has received the message (assuming that S and R are honest).
Proposition 5. Assume that the message from TTP sent on outchannel reaches its
destination. If S authenticates R, and S receives a correct receipt for m, then R has
received m.
Writing P0 for the process that represents the protocol, the proposition becomes, more
formally:
Proposition 5′. Assume that the message from TTP sent on outchannel reaches its
destination. Let Init = {Sname, TTPname, c, cleartext}. For any Init-adversary
Q, if end(SthinksRhas(Message(Rname, Mi, (Auth, Mz)))) is executed in a
reduction trace of P0 | Q for some terms Mi and Mz, then the event
end(Rreceived(Message(Rname, Mi, (Auth, Mz)))) is executed in all continuations of
this trace.
We introduce the following events: at point Event R, we add the event
begin(R_has(secchannel, em2, hr)); at points Event TTP and Event TTP’, we add the
event begin(TTP_send(outchannel, (Try, k3, hr3))).
Automatic part of the proof. We invoke our verifier with the query end(SthinksRhas
(Message(Rname, i, (Auth, z)))). The tool then computes the set of clauses
solveP0,Init(end(SthinksRhas(Message(Rname, i, (Auth, z))))) and returns three clauses,
all of the form
begin(TTP_send((Rname, psecchannel), (Try, pk, phr)))∧
begin(R_has(psecchannel, E(pk, Message(Rname, pi, (Auth, pz))), phr))∧
H → end(SthinksRhas(Message(Rname, pi, (Auth, pz))))
for some patterns pk, phr, psecchannel, pi, pz, and some hypothesis H . So, by Theorem 2,
if the event end(SthinksRhas(Message(Rname, Mi, (Auth, Mz)))) is executed in a
reduction trace of P0 | Q for some terms Mi and Mz, then the events
begin(R_has(Msecchannel, E(Mk, Message(Rname, Mi, (Auth, Mz))), Mhr))
begin(TTP_send((Rname, Msecchannel), (Try, Mk, Mhr)))
are executed in this trace for some terms Mk , Msecchannel, and Mhr .
Manual part of the proof. We show that R executes
end(Rreceived(Message(Rname, Mi, (Auth, Mz))))
exactly as in the proof of Proposition 3′. 
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6. Conclusion
This paper reports on the formal specification of a non-trivial, practical protocol
for certified email, and on the verification of its main security properties. Most of the
verification work is done with an automatic protocol verifier, which we adapted for the
present purposes. The use of this tool significantly reduces the proof burden. It also reduces
the risk of human error in proofs. Although the tool itself has not been verified, we believe
that its use is quite advantageous.
We have also specified and verified more elaborate variants of the protocol, through
similar methods. Specifically, we have treated three ways of establishing the secure channel
between R and TTP: the one explained here, one based on a small public-key protocol,
and one based on a simplified version of the SSH protocol with a Diffie–Hellman key
agreement (challenging in its own right). For these three versions, the automatic parts of
the proofs take 2 min 20 s on an Intel Xeon 1.7 GHz. The manual parts are as simple as
the ones shown above. Writing the specifications was more delicate and interesting than
constructing the corresponding proofs.
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Appendix. Semantics
A semantic configuration is a pair E,P where the environment E is a finite set of names
and P is a finite multiset of closed processes. The environment E must contain at least all
free names of processes in P . The configuration {a1, . . . , an}, {P1, . . . , Pn} corresponds to
the process new a1; . . . new an; (P1 | . . . | Pn). The semantics of the calculus is defined
by a reduction relation → on semantic configurations as follows:
E,P ∪ { 0 } → E,P (Red Nil)
E,P ∪ { !P } → E,P ∪ { P, !P } (Red Repl)
E,P ∪ { P | Q } → E,P ∪ { P, Q } (Red Par)
E,P ∪ { new a; P } → E ∪ {a′},P ∪ { P{a′/a} } (Red Res)
where a′ /∈ E .
E,P ∪ { out(N, M).Q, in(N, x).P } → E,P ∪ { Q, P{M/x} } (Red I/O)
E,P ∪ { let x = g(M1, . . . , Mn) in P else Q } → E,P ∪ { P{M ′/x} }
if g(M1, . . . , Mn) → M ′ (Red Destr 1)
E,P ∪ { let x = g(M1, . . . , Mn) in P else Q } → E,P ∪ { Q }
if there exists no M ′ such that g(M1, . . . , Mn) → M ′ (Red Destr 2)
E,P ∪ { let x = M in P} → E,P ∪ { P{M/x} } (Red Let)
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E,P ∪ { if M = M then P else Q } → E,P ∪ { P } (Red Cond 1)
E,P ∪ { if M = N then P else Q } → E,P ∪ { Q } (Red Cond 2)
if M 	= N
E,P ∪ { begin(M).P } → E,P ∪ { P } (Red Begin)
E,P ∪ { end(M).P } → E,P ∪ { P } (Red End)
A reduction trace T of a closed process P is a finite sequence of reductions
fn(P), {P} → . . . → E ′,P ′.
The output out(M, N) is executed in a trace T if and only if this trace contains a
reduction E,P ∪ { out(N, M).Q, in(N, x).P } → E,P ∪ { Q, P{M/x} } for some E , P ,
x , P , Q.
The event begin(M) is executed in a trace T if and only if this trace contains a reduction
E,P ∪ { begin(M).P } → E,P ∪ { P } for some E , P , P .
The event end(M) is executed in a trace T if and only if this trace contains a reduction
E,P ∪ { end(M).P } → E,P ∪ { P } for some E , P , P .
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